SPEECH 


JOSEPH KENT, OF MARYLAND, 

M 


isr SUPPORT OF 


AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTSTUTSON 


RESTRAIN THE VETO POWER 

OF THE 


PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 


Delivered in the Senate of the United States, on the 20th of February, 1835. 


WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED BT GAIES AND SEATON. 


1835. 




. 1 * -A 


' Iv '. • 




1 

w 


wrm:^ -m 

■T. %■:-. •> • 

.V' •- 




f * 




1 




. >> ,* 


\ 


\ \ . 


* ► . ^ ‘.•/ I 



• t 




*. W , -a , 

r ij.' • >; : 4' • « , "f 


Kf i H 


I : *' 


.■»■ > 


• I 

r 


. -F' 




I • 


I 

. % • 


'i' 

m, 


■ I *'■ 


f* 


' V »' 

I 1 j 



9W'fM 

'»r --ii 

• I* 


}. 




^: t ■ \ !• ■-. • >• * .1 


• Ui / - 




■;f 


^ *’<• 




■. V .„ 


\'Sl 


t , 

t • 


'.1 


.1 •■! 


i 


« 

V 


u . 


4 4 

. » 




, JX * iO ‘ t > 

• t . v ’ ■ 

1 ■ <k . # 


Va 


A 






. w * 

*5 






pr- '>*'•-■'. - t. -. -. 

<■ ' j ' ’ t*. 

' 5*' '^4' U'y.*' • ‘ 

■’'-•A V ' %■ 

''■■ ■ ?. . .i)ft ^ 


‘ V • ^ r 


r 

■i 

l' 

*‘ • . '» -^J 

» »• 1 ^ 

-V 

1 *:*; *J 

U *. ' \j- 

.. ■• 

T A f ^ • 4 1 

' • ) 





’• 1 

■1 


*4 


’ r 


w ^JoP 

' f *■ ‘ v' ''■'' , 

> . .^ .. i 9 f 7 /».. , . 

I ' 





.t| 7 - 




. V' "^-'■-■’\ ' .,.:i .;,l« 

• ' ' ' ■ i'' - ■ ■ ■ 

4 . * • •♦ •■ • t’ * , ,K'. *' • 





■''4 


>•»' 


.\ < 


'« f(. ■', A-'*' 7- 


« »t » 




■» ■ / 


/. 


•■y. 




,v ■ VA», 


*. - 


k 


I’, i' y j t :.t. ' i» 
■ . -■ . 


■'! ".I. :^‘’' '■ 


<, 


• s 


~Mrr 


or 

‘ 4 ' 

V. 


iii-i <<>'>■<! «?’ ‘ 

y ' ■' . 





' . » 


? ' ^yy.L'-. '^ ' V ' ' ■ ^5 


.''Sv 



' r A?A v»vif. 


J# '>* 



T' j 



I 




SPEECH. 


Tlie following resolution being under consideration: 

Resolved^ by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, (twn-tWmh (ifbolh Houses concurring, )That the following article 
be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as an amendment to the consti¬ 
tution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legisla¬ 
tures, shall be valid as part of the constitution: 

>Vhen a bill, which, having pa.ssed the Senate and House of Representatives, shall be 
returned by the President of the United States, with his objections, upon the recon- 
sidei’ation thereof, a majority of all members elected to each House sliall again pass 
such bill, notwithstanding the objections of the President, it shall become a law; and 
the recpiisition of two-thirds in such case, according to the existing constitution, is i‘e- 
voked. 

Mr. KENT addressed the Chair as follows: 

Mr. P resident: I should not, at this late period of the session, have re¬ 
quested the Senate to consider the amendment I have submitted, important 
as I consider it, were it not closely connected with the subject under debate. 

Cautious and reluctant as 1 would he, at all times, in any attempt unneces¬ 
sarily to alter or amend the constitution or frame of government under which 
we live, which I trust will long be the pride of our country, and the admiration 
of the world, I find myself compelled, notwithstanding, to propose the modi¬ 
fication embraced by the resolution, by considerations which, as a public 
man, I cannot resist. 

No one can venerate more than I do that instrument; nor is there one who 
would more readily render a willing homage to the wisdom, virtue, and pa¬ 
triotism of its illustrious authors; but I owe still greater veneration to the 
principles whicii gave existence to the work of their hands, and, while cherish- 
ini: the constitution, I cherish still more the liberties of the country. 

In our endeavors to adjust the delicate springs by which the complicated 
movements of Government are performed, there was always ground to appre¬ 
hend that, in avoiding one danger, we might rush upon another, and thereby 
multiply the evils which we designed to remedy. 

But if warned, by suggestions like these, from unnecessary innovations, or 
precipitate amendments, it is surely not the part of wisdom to reject the ad¬ 
monitions of experience, to shut our eyes against dangers both palpable and 
appalling, to neglect every defence which patriotism might use against the 
approach of despotism, and" to sacrifice the vital principles of the constitution, 
by too closely adhering to its original language, regardless of its spirit, or the 
practice under it. 

Among the practical lessons which have been taught us by the illustrious 
men who framed the constitution, there is none more important than that 
which disclaims all pretence to infallibility, submits the constitution to the 



4 


test of experience, opens It to future amendment, and confides its preservation 
and improvement to the wisdom and virtue of succeedirjg generations. 

Sir, they knew full well that the work which they had formed was but a 
great experiment; they knew it could endure only while cherished by the 
• principles from which it sprang. However admirable in its construction, how¬ 
ever systematical in its parts, they were far from indulging in the presumptuous 
thought that time and experience, those unerring tests of hunian actions, would 
not reveal some latent defect; and whilst interposing proper obstacles to ill- 
judged innovations, tiiey left to posterity' the power to add new guards to the 
constitution, and to accommodate its provisions to future exigencies as they 
should arise. 

With tliesc views, Mr. President, in proposing the amendment which I had 
the honor to submit, I conceived 1 only acted in the spirit of the constitution, 
impelled by no other considerations than those which I trust will forever in¬ 
fluence the friends of American freedom. 1 looked far beyond and above 
the ef)hemeral party divisions of the day, and was willing, if more accept¬ 
able to the Senate, to give to the resolution a prospective operation, and 
thereby avoid all offensive application of it. I considered only tlie preroga¬ 
tives claimed, and llie dangers with which w’e were beset, and sincerely be¬ 
lieved that the proposition on the table was the very one which the framers of 
the constitution would have adopted in the place of the existing j)rovision, 
could they have Ibreseen the more than nn^al pretensions rccentl}'’ set up, or 
anticipated the executive action for the last five or six years. 

Permit me now, Mr. President, to advert to some of those considerations 
which, in my judgment, recommend the adoption of the amendment, which an 
imperious sense of dut}'' alone has prompted me to submit. 

The veto power, as exercised at present, tends to unite the legislative and 
executive powers, than which nothing could be more dangerous to the liberties 
of the country. I presume it may be asserted, as a fundamental principle in 
the science of government which admits of no doubt, that, in all free Gov¬ 
ernments, where the rights of man are recognised, and liberty is cherished, 
the legislative, executive, and judicial pow'ers should be lodged in diflerent 
hands, at least as far as j)racticable, and that their concentration in the same 
hands would constitute the essence of despotism, and lead to intolerable op¬ 
pression. 

Ilistor}^ is replete with examples to this effect, many of wliich I have se¬ 
lected; but I shall forbear to fatigue the Senate \viih referring to them at this 
time, and shall only remark that Mr. Madison, justly styled the “ surviving 
father of the constitution,” has said that “ no political truth is certainly of 
more intrinsic value than the political axiom, that the legislative, executive, 
and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct; and that the accu¬ 
mulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, 
whether of one, of few, or of many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, 
or elective, may he justly pronounced the very definition of tyranny;” and 
this sentiment is fully maintained by the judicious Polybius, in his Review of 
■ the Roman Constitution, in which he distinctly ascribes the existence of liberty 
to the appropriation of distinct and separate powers to the senate, tlie consuls, 
and the }»eople; and he clearly foresaw the termination of the republic, and the 
loss of liberty consequent on the destruction of the equilibrium of the consti¬ 
tution. 

Of these powers, thus assigned to difierent departments, the distribution of 
which is considered indispensable to the existence of liberty under ahv form 
of government, the most important, beyond all doubt, is that of the fegisla- 


5 


tive, wliich it is my object to endeavor to preserve, and to secure against 
executive encroachment. 

It is a principle, not less universally admitted tlian that whicli enjoins the 
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, tliat the law¬ 
making power must be retained by tlie people, and should be exercised by 
representatives chosen for the purpose, and periodically responsible for the 
faithful discharge of their duty. If the power to make laws, whicli, of course, 
includes the power of taxation, should once be permitted to jiass from the' 
hands of llie people into any other department, or into tlie hands of an in¬ 
dividual wielding the self-protecting patronage of the Government, or in any 
way shielded from popular control, it is easy to foresee tlnu the fust step in 
legislative assumption would he to perpijtuate the power thus acquired, and 
that every^successive act would be one of encroachment and oppression. 

This sentiment was boldly asserted and firmly maintained by our patriotic 
ancestors, when they avowed that the legislative power for America could not 
be exercised by a British Parliament, and that the duly authorized delegates 
of the people could alone enact laws by which the people could he bound. 
Not only is it true, sir, as an abstract principle, that the law-making power 
belongs to the people, and can only be exercised by their immediate repre¬ 
sentatives; it is, fortunately, a principle embodied in the constitution of our 
country. In the first section of the lirst article it is declared that “ all legis¬ 
lative powers, herein granted, siiall be vested in a Congress of the Unirnd 
States, which sliall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” 

This Senate and House of Representatives, in which all the legislative 
powers of the Government are exclusively vested, are the delegates or agents 
of the people, chosen immediately by them, or through the instrumentality of 
the Legislatures of the several States, for the sole purpose of making laws. 
They, and they only, are authorized to make them. 

Whether, then, we consider the nature of the legislative power, as expres¬ 
sive of the troneral will of the whole community, or tho provisions of the 
constitution, it is manifest that tlie whole law-making power is vested in the 
Senate and House of Representatives alone; and no President of the United 
States is justifiable in interfering with this power further than to secure himself 
against encroachments upon executive privileges, evidently bestowed upon 
him by the constitution, or to guard the country against the consequences of 
inconsiderate, precipitate, or corrupt legislation. In England, where the 
King is a part of the Parliament, and exercises legislative power, the laws are 
beaded as follows: 

“Re it therefore enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, by and with tlie 
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same.” 

In the United States, where Congress alone exercises legislative powers, 
and the President is only authorized to defend himself against encroachments 
upon his rightful powers, the laws are headed: 

“ Re it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled.” 

AVhy, then, it may be asked, was the assent of the President required to 
all acts, e.xcept those passed by two-thirds of the legislative body] The 
answer is obvious to all who will take the trouble to consult the contempora¬ 
neous expositions of tite constitution, and the early practice of the Govern¬ 
ment ill reference to dae exercise of this power. The power thus granted to 


6 


tlie Executive was not intended to bo active, but defensive; it was not intended 
to give liim any participation in tbe legislative [)ower, but merely to preserve 
the executive department from legislative encroachments, and, as before 
observed, to guard tlie country airainst the effects of inadvertent legislation. 
It was never supposed that any Executive, in a popular Government, would 
attempt to restrain the general will of the community, exf)ressed by the re¬ 
presentatives of the people, clothed exclusively with power to declare that 
will upon matters of mere expediency, in which no executive power was im¬ 
pinged, in which no constitutional question was involved. 

In the most able contemporatK'ous defence of the constitution, the qualified 
negative upon bills passed by Congress was defended solely on the ground ot 
its being a preventive agaitjst legislative .encroachment upon executive func¬ 
tions. 

The first practical exposition of this power will be found in an ofificial 
opinion given by Mr. Jetferson to President Washington, in less tl.an two 
years after the Government went into operation; Mr. .1. being then Secretary 
of State. It was given when the first bill was passed granting a charter to 
the Bank of the United States. I will give only the closing sentence of this 
opinion. He remarks: “ It must be added, however, that, unless the Presi¬ 
dent’s mind, on a view of every thing which is urged for and against this bill, 
is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the constitution; if the pro and 
con, hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom 
of the Legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor of their opin¬ 
ion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by error, ambition, 
or interest, that the constitution has placed a check, in the negative of the 
President.” 

This opinion of Mr. Jefferson covers the whole ground for which I contend, 
namely, the supremacy of the legislative department of the Government, as 
expressive of the will of the community. Let it be remembered that Mr. 
.lefferson practised upon the principles expressed in this opinion. He ap¬ 
proved a supplemental bill to the charter of the Bank of the United States, 
thereby yielding up his constitutional scruples to the will of the Legislature. 

Mr. Jefferson never exercised the veto power during the eight years of Ms 
presidential service; neither did the elder nor the younger Adams. 

“ The primary inducement,” says Mr. Madison, “ in conferring the veto 
power upon the Executive, is to enable him to defend himself. Indeed, even 
in England, where the King is considered a part of the Parliament, and, 
therefore, possessing a share of legislative power, the royal negative would 
only be permitted in cases where encroachments were attempted upon the 
royal prerogatives.” He therefore infers, “ a fortiori'' that in the United 
States, where the President is expressly excluded from any share in the legis¬ 
lative power, the President’s negative would never be permitted by a nation 
of freemen, except in cases where manifest encr oachm ents were attempted 
upon presidential rights and duties, or where the negative was required to 
preserve the constitution from violation. 

Blackstone, in speaking of the negative power in Great Britain, remarks, 
that “ to hinder any encroachment upon the rights and authority vested in 
the Crown, the King is himself a part of the Parliament; and, as this is the 
reason of his being so, very properly, therefore, the share of legislation wdiich 
the constitution has placed in the Crown consists in the power of reje cting, 
rather than resolving; for we may apply to the royal negative in this instance 
what Cicero observes of the negative of the Roman Tribunes, that ‘ the Crown 


7 


has not the power of doing wrong, but merely of preventing wrong being 
done.’ In order to guard against bis interference, it is a rule, not only that the 
King could not send them any express proposition about laws or other subjects, 
but that his name should never be mentioned in their deliberations.” 

Mr. llatniiton is more in detail u|)on this subject, and what he says is equal¬ 
ly applicable in sustaining my proposition. He remarks that— 

“ The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free Gov¬ 
ernment, and the hazard to tlie Executive in a trial of strength with that 
body, afford a satisfactory securit}'^ that tlie negative would generafly be em- 
[doyed with great caution; and tliat, in its exercise, there would oftcner be 
room for a charge of timidity than of rashness. A King of Great Britain, with 
all ills train of sovereign attributes, and with all tlie influence he draws from 
a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the 
joint resolutions ot the two Houses of Parliament. He would not iail to 
exert tlie utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagree¬ 
able to him, in its progress to ilie throne, to avoid being reduced to the 
dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the disfileasure of the 
nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it 
probable that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogative, but in a 
case of manifest propriety, or of extreme necessity. All well-informed men 
in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very con¬ 
siderable period has elapsed since the negative of the Crown has been 
exercised. 

^ “ If a magistrate so powerful, and so well fortified as a British Monarch, 
would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, 
how much greater caution may he reasonably expected in a President of the 
United States, clothed, for the short period of four years, with the executive 
authority of a Government wholly and purely republican? 

“ It is evident that there would he greater danger of his not using his 
power, when nocessary, than of Ins using it too often, or too much. An ar¬ 
gument, iiKloed, against its expedienc}-, has been drawn from this very 
source. It has hen^jn represented on this -account as a power odious in ap¬ 
pearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow that, because it might 
rarely, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly 
designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the 
Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably 
sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitu- 
tutional means of defence, and woukl listen to the admonitions of duty and 
responsibility.” 

Thus, Mr. President, I have given you the opinions entertained of this 
power by the ablest men both in England and America, all of which sustain 
my amendment. I will now proceed to show you that if there is good reason 
why this power s^hould originally have existed in the British constitution, 
from whence it was copied into ours without any effectual modification, we 
must not look tv) that country for any countenance whatever either in its 
use or its abuse in the United “States, 

That strong reasons may be urged why this veto power should he pos¬ 
sessed by a King of England, that do not, and cannot, apply to the President 
of the United States, is beyond all doubt. 

The King of England is an hereditary Monarch; he and his descendants 
» kave a deep personal interest in the Goverment. It behooves them to see 
that theiir rights, dignities, powers, and prerogatives are not modified or less- 


8 


cnod to their prejudice. To enable the King to maintain unimpaired those 
inipor.tant intcresis, lie is made a component part of the Parliament. No 
nu'oting of Parliament can take place without his assent. He convenes and 
he f)t orogues them, either in person or by proxy; and, notwithstanding liis par¬ 
ticipation, under the constitution of the realm, in the legislative duties ol the 
Gov('rnnieiit; notwithstanding the deep individual interest of himself and fam¬ 
ily in the monarchy; and notwithstanding his possessing an absolute negative 
upon ail laws passed by Parliament, he has had good sense enough to refrain 
from the exercise of tliis odious and oppressive power since 1692. Tlie 
Kings of England, yielding to the influence of liberal principles, and what tliey 
belieVe to be due to the expression of public sentiment, through the repre¬ 
sentatives in Parliament, have abstained from the use of this power for the 
space of one hundred and forty-two years; whilst a President of the United 
Suites, in tins enlightened age, disregarding the influence of those liberal 
principles, alihougb our institutions are based upon them, and in defiance of 
public sentiment, has made the exercise of tlio qualified veto pow'er, obnox¬ 
ious and despotic as it is, a measure of almost every day’s occurrence. 

“ The prerogative of the King of England embraces large powers, great 
privileges, and ample revenues, amounting to four or five millions of dollars per 
annum. He can do no w'rong, and in him there is no weakness or folly.” Thus 
able writers describe him; and the absolup; negative granted to him was be¬ 
stowed to enable him to preserve those' great immunities unimpaired, but 
Ji8 never finds it necessary to use it. 

Very different, sir, is the condition of the President of the United States. 
He is only the chief executive agent, and, like us, tlie servant of the people,, 
and not the less so because he occupies a somewhat higher station, elected 
only for four years; and, when he discharges the duties of iiis office v/ith fidel¬ 
ity and ability, has an arduous time of it. He possesses under the constitu¬ 
tion no inviolability of [lerson; he has no exclusive, no personal interest in 
the Government; no prerogative to contend for against Lords and Commons- 
His duties are plainly laid down. He has not a privilege above, or distinct 
from, the humblest citizen of the country. He is liable to impeachment, trial,, 
condemnation, and |)unishment, as well as other officers of the Government; 
and when his period of service has expired, w'hieh heretofore on no occasion 
has exceeded eight years, tlie incumbent has retired to the walks of pri¬ 
vate life, to participate with his fellow-men in the good or the evil that 
might befall tlie country. 

Here, then, is a marked distinction as regards the veto^ power bestowed 
upon the executive department of the respective Governments. The King 
of England, I repeat, has a deep exclusive personal interest in the Govern- 
mr-nf, which passes from him to his descendants, and which might require 
the exercise of the veto power to preserve it; whilst the President of the Uni¬ 
ted .States has no interest wdiatever in the Government, but what he bolds in 
common with the mass of bis fellow-citizens. 

One advantage 1 admit the veto power to possess, and mie only of import¬ 
ance, and that the amendment i propose does not disturb; in truth, there is 
no proper benefit resulting from it that the proposed amendfiienl does not 
leave unimpaired, at the same time that it secures to the legislative body its 
just powers. The veto power, when judiciously exercised', is designed lo¬ 
calise any act of Congress obnoxious to the Executive to be re-examined- 
Tne reasons assigned by a President for rejecting a bill or resolution would 
bring in review not only all the arguraents pro and con, in relation to tbs' 


9 


measure tliat had been previously used in discussing it, but the two Houses 
would be aided by the new light thrown upon the subject in the argument 
presented to them by the Cliiel Magistrate. The oftener a measure is brought 
under examination, the greater the diversity in the situation of those who are 
to examine it; the less must be the danger of those errors which How for want 
of due deliberation, or which might result from the effects of faction, pre¬ 
cipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good. But after this 
review, this re-examination, this investigation for a third lime, of the subject, 
should a majority of all the members elected to either House be decidedly in 
favor of any measure thus acted on, I cannot consent that the public will, thus 
expressed through their immediate representatives, should be thwarted, should 
be placed at the absolute will and control of a single individual. It is ad¬ 
mitting that a single man may possess more wdsdom, more virtue, more 
patriotism, than shall be contained in both Houses of Congress. It tends 
to destroy all confidence in a representative Government, and establishes a 
preference for dictatorial power; it uproots the representative system, upon 
which our institutions are based. 

Sir, from what I have said, I take it for granted, as an incontestable principle, 
which no citizen of the United States will be bold enough to deny, that the 
qualified negative of the President upon the acts of Congress was granted by 
the constitution only for the purpose of protecting the executive authority 
from legislative encroachment; that it should be restricted to that object only; 
and that its application to any other is an abuse of power. Not many years 
since, Mr. President, 1 heard an old and experienced member of the House 
of Representatives declare, upon the floor of that House, that the President 
of the United States possessed more power than the King of England, and 
said he was borne out in this opinion by the correspondence of Mr. Jef¬ 
ferson. If I am not prepared to give my full assent to this sentiment at this 
time, (and 1 am certainly now more inclined towards the opinion than formerly,) 
I have no hesitation in believing that there is less danger to be apprehended 
from an attempt at encroachment by the legislative department of the Gov¬ 
ernment upon the executive, than of a similar attempt by the executive upon 
the legislative. The Senate will indulge me with a few words upon this 
point, as it has an important bearing upon the subject before us. Let us con¬ 
sider, then, in the first place, the nature of those bodies to which the legisla¬ 
tive and executive powers are confined. The legislative department is com¬ 
posed of many individuals, strangers to each other, with conflicting interests 
and views, coming from every part of the country, elected for short periods, 
compelled to hear, in their own persons and through their oflspring, the bur¬ 
den of those measures they may sanction; whose personal qualities, known to 
their constituents, are, in some degree, a pledge for their fidelity; liable to be 
broken up in fragments of opposing parties by ministerial influence and exe¬ 
cutive control; who never can be brought to act in concert against the per¬ 
suasions, the influence, and the patronage of any Executive, except by the 
weight of some impending danger, sufficient to hush into silence the most 
discordant elements. 

Every one of those features in the composition of the legislative depart¬ 
ment of the Government forbids the jirobabilily that any design inimical to the 
executive department could ever then be formed. The short period of service 
for which they are elected renders it Impossible that they could carry out any 
such design, if ever formed, into systematic and continued action. And, 
moreover, why should the Legislature, as a body, desire the possession of 


10 


executive jDower, when the very numbers of which this body is composed 
would prevent tlie possibility of their discharging the duties attached to it. 
Mr. President, from the very nature of things, the legislative encroachment 
upon the executive department is not the danger to be feared; there is more 
danger that, holding in tlieir hands the privileges of the people, they will not 
be sufficiently firm in the hour of danger, and at all times sufficiently tena¬ 
cious of their rightful powers: there lies the danger. 

The executive department is, in all respects, entirely difierent. The Pre¬ 
sident is elected for a longer period than the representatives of the people. 
He is master of his own secrets; he is not hound to communicate his ambi¬ 
tious designs; his real character may be unknown to the great body ot the 
people. The most artful schemes for the perpetuation of his power may be 
masked under hypocritical pretences for the public good; his whole power is 
undivided; he alone is responsible; he wields an immense patronage; and ids 
power and patronage, thus moved by a single will, may be brought to bear 
upon a single point, and be made conducive to a single object—his own ag¬ 
grandizement. 

More frequently than otherwise he is an ambitious man; his objects are 
vast; his lust of power increases with its possession; and, disdaining the fetters 
of legislative restraint, he seeks to control, if he cannot remove them. 

Is it not then true, sir, that here is the weak point of every Republican 
Government? Is it not true that the executive department of the Govern¬ 
ment should invariably arouse the watchful jealousy of freemen? Take the 
history of the world. Who have disregarded the limitations of power? Who 
have trampled on the rights of the people? Who have been most eager 
to monopolize power? Has it been Senators or Emperors, Parliaments or 
Kings, the Representatives of the people or the Executive Magistrate, grasf)- 
ing, against law, a public treasury, and wielding effectually both purse and 
sword? 

Histor}^ sir, abounds in examples, establishing the undeniable fact that in 
all ages of the world, the chief Executive Magistrate, however chosen and 
however restrained, has been the great agent for working the oppression of 
the people and the destruction of freedom. It matters not with whatsoever 
dignities invested, and within whatsoever rules confined, the accumulation of 
power in his own hands seems the great object of his exertions, and en¬ 
croachment on encroachment the very law of his nature. 

Mr. President, shall I refer to historical incidents, and inquire whether it 
was Pericles or the Areopagus that subverted the Athenian commonwealth? 
whether it was Caesar or the Senate that destroyed the liberty of Rome? 
whether it was Cromwell or the Parliament that established dictatorial power 
in England? whether it was not the First Consul of France who, disdaining 
the restraints of legislative authority, established an Imperial Government, 
and made his will the only law? It is undeniable, sir, that there is a 
constant tendency in the executive power of every Government, and espe¬ 
cially oui-s, to contemn the barriers of the constitution, to construe at its plea¬ 
sure the enactments of the law, to decide for itself the limitations upon its 
own action, and gradually to undermine the legitimate influence of the co-or¬ 
dinate branches of the Government. 

This view of the subject is not new. It is to be met wdth interspersed 
every where amidst the prophetic apprehensions of the sages and patriots of 
our country during the discussions that preceded the adoption of the consti- 


11 


tution of the United States; and I am pained to say that what was prophecy 
tlien is 100 rapidly becoming history. 

Of all the means by which the executive department will be able to de¬ 
stroy the equilibrium of the constitution, and to absorb in its own vortex ihe 
legislative and judicial powers, the exercise on common occasions of its quali¬ 
fied negative, thereby preventing the enactments of laws which have received 
the sanction of both branches of the Legislature after great deliberation and 
ample discussion, is by far the most alarming. 

A few words will show the formidable nature of this pretension, this 
palpable abuse of a self-defensive, and, so far as purely self-defensive, bene¬ 
ficial power. 

In all free Governments parties will exist. When founded on abstract 
principles, and not devoted to nten, those parties are useful. At the head of 
one ot those parlies will always be found the successful candidate for the 
presidential otfice. It will generally appear that the party who first sup¬ 
ported will afterwards sustain him. In all his measures he calculates on 
party adhesion. The immense patronage he wields not only forms a cement 
by which the unity of his own party is preserved, but presents attractions by 
which its numbers are recruited, and its active opponents neutralized and 
silenced. By means of this patronage pervading the whole community, the 
existing Chief Magistrate at all times exerts a silent but powerful influence 
upon popular elections, which is gready increased by executive officers them¬ 
selves intermingling in elections, exerting all their means, their influence, 
their credit, in behalf of the candidates most friendly to their chief, and espe¬ 
cially when the power of appointment and removal is practically vested in 
the President alone, and every appointment shall be made agreeably to the 
degree of partisan zeal which the expectants of office shall display, and when 
continuance in office shall depend upon elasticity of conscience, intensity of 
zeal, and the effective aid which the incumbent will be able to render in 
every emergency to the political manager or idol of the day. It can seldom 
happen that any President, brought into olfice as the head of a great party, 
who are bound to each other by the ties of interest, wielding to any purpose 
the appointments at his disposal, directing the disbursements of the immense 
revenue subjected to his control, and unblushingly holding the honors and 
emoluments of office as the price of fidelity or the spoils of victory, will fail in 
commandino', whenever so inclined, a majority in one or the other of the two 
Houses of Congress. Should that majority happen to be found in the House 
of Representatives, the danger to liberty will be the greater, and could only 
be checked by the vigilance of freemen and the spirit of the people. 

And let us suppose, sir, that, in addition to the power granted to the 
President by the constitution, to recommend to Congress such measures as 
he shall judge necessary and expedient, he shall exercise, indireclly, by 
members speaking his known sentiments, the initiative power in the busi¬ 
ness of legislation, and the negative power upon all such of their proceedings 
as may not comport with his previous views, however capricious they may 
be; will it not be evident that he possesses an effective control over the 
whole legislation of tlie country! What becomes, then, of the “ beau ideal” 
of the separation of powers'? What becomes, then, of that distinct will of 
each department of the Government, upon matters specially confided to it 
by the constitution, which Mr. Madison asserted, as admitted on all hands, 
“ was essential to liberty'?” Where shall we find that perfect equilibrium, 
which is to prevent one department of the Government from encroaching 


12 


on the others? But let us suppose that, hereafter, you may have a President 
wlio will take special pains to declare the executive will beforehand upon 
matters specially confided to the legislative department, and entirely within 
tiie sphere of legislative action, and, anticipating an approaching meeting of 
Congress, publish to the world an executive manifesto, declaring the linal 
opinions of the Executive upon the great questions of currency, com¬ 
merce, peace, and war, so as effectually to preclude all legislative inquiry, and 
to leave to Congress merely the privilege of recording the executive decrees. 
What, then, becomes of the balance of power? Where, then, is the legisla¬ 
tive power? Will you not have then the very accumulation of power, legisla¬ 
tive, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, which Mr. Madison describes 
as the very definition of tyranny? Where will you then find a corrective for 
executive abuses? What power shall arrest executive usurpation? Will a 
solitary voice in the legislative halls avail you any thing? No, sir; the sug¬ 
gestions of patriotism, wisdom, and experience, embodied in the most elo¬ 
quent language, would be disregarded by the representatives of a dominant 
party, elected through executive influence. But suppose, against all proba¬ 
bility, you should find that majority; what hope will remain, with the execu¬ 
tive veto staring us in the face? Can any one suppose that two-thirds of both 
branches of the Legislature will ever be found to concur in the enactment of 
a law which the President is known to disapprove? An}'^ bill involving great 
principles has been rarely, if ever, known to. pass through Congress but by 
bare majorities, even where the sentiments of the Executive wore unknown. 
Has an instance yet occurred of the enactment of any law, which the Presi¬ 
dent had returned with his objections? Let this veto power be exerted in 
all its extent, and the legislative power vested in Congress by the constitution 
is no more. Restrict the President in whatever other way you please, still 
from that moment he becomes absolute in his actions, a monarch, a dictator, 
a despot. Yes, sir, from that moment the revolution is achieved, and the 
J).g 0 plr. arc slaves. Will such a power be suffered longer to remain to the 
Executive unrestricted, a power which a King of England has so long refrained 
from exercising, that it may be said to be obsolete? What has been its ope¬ 
ration here? It has changed the whole course of the legislation of the country. 

The veto power, applied to the bill appropriating the proceeds of the 
public lands, gratified the new States. The same power, arresting a system 
of internal improvements, pleases the South. The seizure and transfer of 
the public deposites, by a stretch of executive power, is highly acceptable 
to another important section of the country. Thus the exercise of this 
power secures to the Executive friends enough in each of those sections of 
the country to ensure him a majority, whilst perhaps neither would entirely 
be satisfied with what so much pleased the other. 

In conclusion, Mr. President, let us look into the manner in which this 
power to negative legislative acts has heretofore been exercised, and what we 
may expect from its overwhelming effects, if it shall be left unrestrained. At 
the commencement of the Government, we shall find it directed to objects of 
little interest and of less importance; for a number of years it was used to 
correct the effects of hasty or inadvertent legislation, it performed the office for 
which it was designed, and confined its operation to cases where the constitu¬ 
tion was alleged to have been violated by the enactment of the bill; as time rolls 
on, it outstrips in its pretensions all that the early enemies of a strong execu¬ 
tive had predicted. It is confined no longer to alleged violations of the con- 


13 


stitution, or to enactments supposed to impinge executive authority; it has 
invaded the field of general legislation. 

It assumes the power to} decide, originally and finally, no questions of finance, 
of commerce, of currency; in a word, whatever can affect the happiness and safety 
of the whole community, and the individual prosperity of every citizen. Nor 
is this universal assumption of legislative power by the chief Executive Ma¬ 
gistrate a rare occurrence. Formerly, the return of a bill with the President’s 
objections constituted an epoch in the annals of legislation. Twice only did 
it occur, on trivial subjects, in the first twenty-two years of the Government. 
Now, sir, it may bo said to rank with the familiar occurrences of the day. 
Seven times was it exerted within the first five years of the present adminis¬ 
tration, and that, too, upon bills not novel in their character, but well known 
to the people, and embracing numerous subjects deeply interesting to them. 
Independent of these facts, what have we beheld within a short period? The 
executive will arrayed against the legislative will, upon subjects confided to 
the legislation of Congress; the Executive not the agent to execute, but the 
master to dictate; the President not waiting for laws to be passed and pre¬ 
sented for his approbation, but anticipating and controlling legislative action, 
by proclaiming, in advance, his settled determination; interposing objections 
to important measures, which, after mature deliberation and public discus¬ 
sion, legislative wisdom had devised; entering busily into the initiative mea¬ 
sures of the law-making department; proposing, most considerately, to re¬ 
lieve Congress from the duties which the constitution had devolved upon them; 
offering, if desired, to prepare for their use the model of an act which they 
might register, and he approve; and even declaring, if we are correctly 
informed, that if the most noted and fatal of his legislative experiments should, 
in the lapse of time, fail to accomplish the purposes intended, or prove wholly 
destructive to the vital interests of the nation, he would then be prepared with 
another experiment. Nay, sir, so rapid and so alarming have been the strides 
of executive power over the prostrate constitution, so palpable the abuses, so 
deadly the thrusts which have been committed under the cloak of a power 
intended only as a shield, that the President appears to have designedly, at 
the approach of a late session, anticipated the action of Congress upon a sub¬ 
ject with which the law-making power alone had the right to intermeddle; 
as if for the purpose of controlling the action of Congress on the very sub¬ 
ject, and of keeping (by means of the veto power) the legislative remedies for 
an act extending greatly the executive power more perfectly at his disposal. 

Sir, when these two examples are before us, in the very infancy of our Gov¬ 
ernment, what may we not apprehend from the accumulating encroachment of 
future years? More danger is always to be apprehended from the illegal 
exercise of power than from the quantum granted. The dictatorial power, 
when legally conferred and legally exercised, proved no detriment to the liber¬ 
ties of Rome. But when Caesar passed the Rubicon with a victorious army, 
in open and successful defiance of positive law, the will of one man became 
superior to the law, and the republic was changed to an imperial throne. The 
reason is obvious: when power, however great, is conferred by law, checks 
and limitations may be interposed to render it innoxious; but when power can 
successfully transcend a constitutional or legal restraint, even in a matter 
apparently unimportant, who will be able to interpose a check to the suc¬ 
cessful progress of usurpation, when the enslavement of the people may be 
the consequence, and a crown the prize? 


14 


Mr. President, the Executive has, in every age and in every country, been 
the bane of liberty. It is that power in the Stale which possesses an activity 
which never slumbers. Its never-ceasing tendency is to increase the spltere 
ot its own action, and to swell the number of its votaries. The dignities and 
emoluments which it commands are addressed to the strongest passions that 
can sway the human breast. Its operations are unseen, its movements unlelt, 
its impulses unknown, until we behold their efiects upon the freedom of ft 
country, and find its liberties writliing beneath their influence, and expiring 
in the agonies of death. The deadly potion which they administer will be 
often [)resented with a winning smile. 

So long as confined within its legitimate sphere, the executive power con¬ 
tains within itself an impelling force, which scarcely any free Government is 
able to resist; but, if it once successfully enters upon legislative action, the 
people are undone. 

Mr. President, in my humble judgment, the presidential negative upon 
legislative proceedings, as now practised and abused, is entirely inconsistent 
with republican freedom. The people must curtail it, or prepare for subjuga¬ 
tion. All history proves that power is never sated; usurpation never stops. 
If the. public will is not respected and obeyed by the Chief Magistrate of the 
land, when expressed by representatives coming fresh from the people, that 
Magistrate will soon be superior to the constitution and the law. Soon did I 
sayl He has them^ through the agency of the veto power, already under his 
foot. 


NOTES. 


General Jackson has exercised the veto power on the following bills: 

May Sr, 1830. “ An act to authorize a subscription of stock in the Maysville, Wash¬ 
ington, Paris, and Lexington turnpike road company.” 

May 31, 1831. “ An act to authorize a subscription of stock in the Washington turn¬ 
pike road company.” 

December 7, 1831. “ An act making appropriations for building light-houses, light- 
boats, beacons, monuments, placing buoys, and for improving harbors and directing 
surveys;” and “An act to authorize a subscription for stock in the Louisville and Port¬ 
land canal company.” 

July 10, 1832. “ An act to modify and continue an act to incorporate the subscribers 
to the Bank of the United States.” . 

December 6, 1832. “An act providing for the final settlement of the claims of 
States, for interest on advances made to the United States during the late war.” 

December 5, 1833. “ An act t‘» appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of the 
sales of the public lands of the United States, and for granting lands to certain States.” 

1834. “ An act making an appropriation for improving the navigation of the Wabash 
river.” 

In the following States the Executives have either no negative power, or the one mv 
amendment would leave to the President of the United States, viz: Virginia, North 
Carolina, Soutli Carolina, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Delaware, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, and Alabama. 

And those that follow possess the negative power given to the President of the United 
States by the constitution, viz: New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsyl¬ 
vania, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Maine. 













